to consult our own feelings, and to seek
directly our own interest and happiness. The affections lead us to allow
for the feelings, and consider the advantage and comfort of other men;
and a certain balance between these principles is essential to the
healthy state of the moral being. It is seldom that the affections are
likely to acquire an undue influence, but there is great danger of
self-love degenerating into selfishness, which interferes with the
duties we owe to others. We have formerly alluded to the means,
referable to the due exercise of the affections, and even to a sound and
rational self-love, by which this should be in part prevented. When
these are not sufficient, the appeal is to conscience; or a distinct
reference of individual cases is made to the great principle of moral
rectitude. We find, accordingly, this principle called into action, when
a man has become sensible of important defects in his moral habits.
Thus, we may see a man, who has long given way to a peevish or irascible
disposition, that is, to selfish acting upon his own feelings, without
due regard to the feelings of others, setting himself to contend with
this propensity upon the score of moral duty; while another, of a placid
disposition, has no need of bringing the principle into action for such
a purpose. In the same manner, a person who has indulged a cold
contracted selfishness may, under the influence of the same great
principle, perform deeds of benevolence and kindness. Thus we perceive
that the moral principle or sense of duty, when it is made the
regulating motive of action, is calculated to control self-love, and
preserve the proper harmony between it and the exercise of the
affections.
When the principle of self-love becomes deranged in its exercise and
objects, it leads to those habits by which a man seeks his own
gratification, in a way which interferes with his duties to other men.
This he may do by an undue pursuit of any of the desires,--whether
avarice, ambition, love of eminence, or love of fame;--and the desire of
knowledge itself may be so indulged as to assume the same character.
Even deeds of benevolence and kindness may be performed on this
principle,--as when a man, by such actions, seeks only the applause of
the public, or the approbation of certain individuals from whom, it may
be, he expects to derive advantage.--Hence the value we attach, in the
exercise of all the affections, to what we call disinterested
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