tion. We feel our way to the proper measure of
these sacrifices, by the high principle of moral duty, along with that
mental exercise which places us in the situation of others, and, by a
kind of reflected self-love, judges of the conduct due by us to them in
our respective circumstances.--The details of this subject would lead us
into a field too extensive for our present purpose. Pecuniary aid, by
those who have the means, is the most easy form in which benevolence
can be gratified, and that which often requires the least, if any,
sacrifice of personal comfort or self-love. The same affection maybe
exercised in a degree much higher in itself, and often much more useful
to others, by personal exertion and personal kindness. The former,
compared with the means of the individual, may present a mere mockery of
mercy; while the latter, even in the lowest walks of life, often exhibit
the brightest displays of active usefulness that can adorn the human
character. This high and pure benevolence not only is dispensed with
willingness, when occasions present themselves; but seeks out
opportunities for itself, and feels in want of its natural and healthy
exercise when deprived of an object on which it may be bestowed.

(2.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the reputation of others.
This consists not only in avoiding any injury to their characters, but
in exertions to protect them against the injustice of others,--to
correct misrepresentations,--to check the course of slander, and to
obviate the efforts of those who would poison the confidence of friends,
or disturb the harmony of society.

(3.) Benevolence is to be exercised towards the character and conduct of
others; especially when these have been in opposition to our personal
interest or self-love. This consists in viewing their conduct with
indulgence and forbearance, assigning the most favourable motives,--and
making every allowance for their feelings, and the circumstances in
which they were placed. It leads us also to avoid all suspicions and
jealousies which are not clearly justified by fact; and to abstain to
the utmost from taking offence,--by putting upon the conduct of others
the best construction of which it will possibly admit. It extends still
farther to the actual forgiveness of injuries, and the repaying of evil
with good,--a conduct represented in the sacred writings as one of the
highest attainments the human character can reach, in so far as regard