nce,--and there are two conclusions
which arise out of it respecting the cultivation of the benevolent
affections. The one relates to the bad effects of fictitious scenes of
sorrow, as represented on the stage, or in works of fancy. The evil
arising from these appears to be that which has now been referred
to;--the emotion is produced without the corresponding action, and the
consequence is likely to be a cold and useless sentimentalism, instead
of a sound cultivation of the benevolent affections.--The second
is,--that, in cultivating the benevolent affections in the young, we
should be careful to observe the process so clearly pointed out by the
philosophy of the moral feelings. They should be familiarized with
actual scenes of suffering, but this ought to be accompanied by deeds of
minute and active kindness, so as to produce a full and lively
impression of the wants and feelings of the sufferer. On this ground,
also, I think we should at first even abstain, in a great measure, from
giving young persons the cautions they will afterwards find so
requisite, respecting the character of the objects of their benevolence,
and the impositions so frequently practised by the poor. Suspicions of
this kind might tend to interfere with the important moral process which
ought to be our first object,--the necessary cautions will afterwards be
learned with little difficulty.

The best mode of contending with the evils of pauperism, on the
principles of political economy, is a problem on which I presume not to
enter. But, on the principles of moral science, a consideration of the
utmost importance should never be forgotten,--the great end to be
answered by the varieties of human condition in the cultivation of the
benevolent affections. Political science passes its proper boundary when
it is permitted in any degree to interfere with this high
principle;--and, on the other hand, it is not to be denied, that this
important purpose is in a great measure frustrated by many of those
institutions, which cut off the direct intercourse of the prosperous and
the wealthy with those whom providence has committed to them, in this
scene of moral discipline, as the objects of their benevolent care.

III. The third point, which remains to be briefly mentioned, is the
feeling of moral approbation, or rather the impression of merit, which
is frequently attached to the exercise of the affections. This important
subject has been already referred to.