brought within this range. I have said, and I repeat it here, that
if there be a man amongst us who does not think that the institution of
slavery is wrong in any one of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is
misplaced, and ought not to be with us. And if there be a man amongst us
who is so impatient of it as a wrong as to disregard its actual
presence among us and the difficulty of getting rid of it suddenly in a
satisfactory way, and to disregard the constitutional obligations thrown
about it, that man is misplaced if he is on our platform. We disclaim
sympathy with him in practical action. He is not placed properly with us.

On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let me
say a word. Has anything ever threatened the existence of this Union save
and except this very institution of slavery? What is it that we hold most
dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. What has ever threatened
our liberty and prosperity, save and except this institution of slavery?
If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition of things by
enlarging slavery, by spreading it out and making it bigger? You may have
a wen or cancer upon your person, and not be able to cut it out, lest
you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure it, to engraft it and
spread it over your whole body. That is no proper way of treating what you
regard a wrong. You see this peaceful way of dealing with it as a wrong,
restricting the spread of it, and not allowing it to go into new
countries where it has not already existed. That is the peaceful way,
the old-fashioned way, the way in which the fathers themselves set us the
example.

On the other hand, I have said there is a sentiment which treats it as not
being wrong. That is the Democratic sentiment of this day. I do not mean
to say that every man who stands within that range positively asserts that
it is right. That class will include all who positively assert that it is
right, and all who, like Judge Douglas, treat it as indifferent and do not
say it is either right or wrong. These two classes of men fall within the
general class of those who do not look upon it as a wrong. And if there
be among you anybody who supposes that he, as a Democrat, can consider
himself "as much opposed to slavery as anybody," I would like to reason
with him. You never treat it as a wrong. What other thing that you
consider as a wrong do you deal with as you deal with that? Perhaps