onsequence will follow; and because this consequence
would follow, his argument is, the decision cannot, therefore, be that
way,--"that would spoil my popular sovereignty; and it cannot be possible
that this great principle has been squelched out in this extraordinary
way. It might be, if it were not for the extraordinary consequences of
spoiling my humbug."

Another feature of the judge's argument about the Dred Scott case is,
an effort to show that that decision deals altogether in declarations of
negatives; that the Constitution does not affirm anything as expounded
by the Dred Scott decision, but it only declares a want of power a total
absence of power, in reference to the Territories. It seems to be his
purpose to make the whole of that decision to result in a mere negative
declaration of a want of power in Congress to do anything in relation to
this matter in the Territories. I know the opinion of the Judges states
that there is a total absence of power; but that is, unfortunately; not
all it states: for the judges add that the right of property in a slave is
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. It does not stop
at saying that the right of property in a slave is recognized in the
Constitution, is declared to exist somewhere in the Constitution, but says
it is affirmed in the Constitution. Its language is equivalent to saying
that it is embodied and so woven in that instrument that it cannot be
detached without breaking the Constitution itself. In a word, it is part
of the Constitution.

Douglas is singularly unfortunate in his effort to make out that decision
to be altogether negative, when the express language at the vital part is
that this is distinctly affirmed in the Constitution. I think myself, and
I repeat it here, that this decision does not merely carry slavery into
the Territories, but by its logical conclusion it carries it into the
States in which we live. One provision of that Constitution is, that it
shall be the supreme law of the land,--I do not quote the language,--any
constitution or law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This
Dred Scott decision says that the right of property in a slave is affirmed
in that Constitution which is the supreme law of the land, any State
constitution or law notwithstanding. Then I say that to destroy a thing
which is distinctly affirmed and supported by the supreme law of the land,
even by a State constitution or law, is a violation of