that supreme law,
and there is no escape from it. In my judgment there is no avoiding that
result, save that the American people shall see that constitutions are
better construed than our Constitution is construed in that decision. They
must take care that it is more faithfully and truly carried out than it is
there expounded.
I must hasten to a conclusion. Near the beginning of my remarks I said
that this insidious Douglas popular sovereignty is the measure that now
threatens the purpose of the Republican party to prevent slavery from
being nationalized in the United States. I propose to ask your attention
for a little while to some propositions in affirmance of that statement.
Take it just as it stands, and apply it as a principle; extend and apply
that principle elsewhere; and consider where it will lead you. I now put
this proposition, that Judge Douglas's popular sovereignty applied will
reopen the African slave trade; and I will demonstrate it by any variety
of ways in which you can turn the subject or look at it.
The Judge says that the people of the Territories have the right, by his
principle, to have slaves, if they want them. Then I say that the people
in Georgia have the right to buy slaves in Africa, if they want them;
and I defy any man on earth to show any distinction between the two
things,--to show that the one is either more wicked or more unlawful; to
show, on original principles, that one is better or worse than the other;
or to show, by the Constitution, that one differs a whit from the other.
He will tell me, doubtless, that there is no constitutional provision
against people taking slaves into the new Territories, and I tell him
that there is equally no constitutional provision against buying slaves
in Africa. He will tell you that a people, in the exercise of popular
sovereignty, ought to do as they please about that thing, and have slaves
if they want them; and I tell you that the people of Georgia are as much
entitled to popular sovereignty and to buy slaves in Africa, if they want
them, as the people of the Territory are to have slaves if they want them.
I ask any man, dealing honestly with himself, to point out a distinction.
I have recently seen a letter of Judge Douglas's in which, without stating
that to be the object, he doubtless endeavors to make a distinction
between the two. He says he is unalterably opposed to the repeal of the
laws against the African slave trade. And why? He th
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