ds Congress to deprive a man of his property, without
due process of law; the right of property in slaves is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in that Constitution: therefore, if Congress shall
undertake to say that a man's slave is no longer his slave when he crosses
a certain line into a Territory, that is depriving him of his property
without due process of law, and is unconstitutional." There is the whole
Dred Scott decision. They add that if Congress cannot do so itself,
Congress cannot confer any power to do so; and hence any effort by the
Territorial Legislature to do either of these things is absolutely decided
against. It is a foregone conclusion by that court.
Now, as to this indirect mode by "unfriendly legislation," all lawyers
here will readily understand that such a proposition cannot be tolerated
for a moment, because a legislature cannot indirectly do that which it
cannot accomplish directly. Then I say any legislation to control this
property, as property, for its benefit as property, would be hailed by
this Dred Scott Supreme Court, and fully sustained; but any legislation
driving slave property out, or destroying it as property, directly or
indirectly, will most assuredly, by that court, be held unconstitutional.
Judge Douglas says if the Constitution carries slavery into the
Territories, beyond the power of the people of the Territories to control
it as other property; then it follows logically that every one who swears
to support the Constitution of the United States must give that support
to that property which it needs. And, if the Constitution carries slavery
into the Territories, beyond the power of the people, to control it as
other property, then it also carries it into the States, because the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Now, gentlemen, if it were
not for my excessive modesty, I would say that I told that very thing to
Judge Douglas quite a year ago. This argument is here in print, and if it
were not for my modesty, as I said, I might call your attention to it. If
you read it, you will find that I not only made that argument, but made it
better than he has made it since.
There is, however, this difference: I say now, and said then, there is no
sort of question that the Supreme Court has decided that it is the right
of the slave holder to take his slave and hold him in the Territory; and
saying this, judge Douglas himself admits the conclusion. He says if that
is so, this c
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