story, which I have run over briefly, is, I presume, as
familiar to most of this assembly as any other part of the history of our
country. I suppose that few of my hearers are not as familiar with that
part of history as I am, and I only mention it to recall your attention
to it at this time. And hence I ask how extraordinary a thing it is that a
man who has occupied a position upon the floor of the Senate of the United
States, who is now in his third term, and who looks to see the government
of this whole country fall into his own hands, pretending to give a
truthful and accurate history o the slavery question in this country,
should so entirely ignore the whole of that portion of our history--the
most important of all. Is it not a most extraordinary spectacle that a man
should stand up and ask for any confidence in his statements who sets out
as he does with portions of history, calling upon the people to believe
that it is a true and fair representation, when the leading part and
controlling feature of the whole history is carefully suppressed?

But the mere leaving out is not the most remarkable feature of this most
remarkable essay. His proposition is to establish that the leading men
of the Revolution were for his great principle of nonintervention by the
government in the question of slavery in the Territories, while history
shows that they decided, in the cases actually brought before them, in
exactly the contrary way, and he knows it. Not only did they so decide
at that time, but they stuck to it during sixty years, through thick and
thin, as long as there was one of the Revolutionary heroes upon the stage
of political action. Through their whole course, from first to last, they
clung to freedom. And now he asks the community to believe that the men
of the Revolution were in favor of his great principle, when we have the
naked history that they themselves dealt with this very subject matter
of his principle, and utterly repudiated his principle, acting upon
a precisely contrary ground. It is as impudent and absurd as if a
prosecuting attorney should stand up before a jury and ask them to convict
A as the murderer of B, while B was walking alive before them.

I say, again, if judge Douglas asserts that the men of the Revolution
acted upon principles by which, to be consistent with themselves, they
ought to have adopted his popular sovereignty, then, upon a consideration
of his own argument, he had a right to make