you believe that they
understood the principles of government, but misapplied them, that he
has arisen to enlighten the world as to the just application of this
principle. He has a right to try to persuade you that he understands their
principles better than they did, and, therefore, he will apply them now,
not as they did, but as they ought to have done. He has a right to go
before the community and try to convince them of this, but he has no right
to attempt to impose upon any one the belief that these men themselves
approved of his great principle. There are two ways of establishing a
proposition. One is by trying to demonstrate it upon reason, and the other
is, to show that great men in former times have thought so and so, and
thus to pass it by the weight of pure authority. Now, if Judge Douglas
will demonstrate somehow that this is popular sovereignty,--the right of
one man to make a slave of another, without any right in that other or
any one else to object,--demonstrate it as Euclid demonstrated
propositions,--there is no objection. But when he comes forward, seeking
to carry a principle by bringing to it the authority of men who themselves
utterly repudiate that principle, I ask that he shall not be permitted to
do it.

I see, in the judge's speech here, a short sentence in these words: "Our
fathers, when they formed this government under which we live, understood
this question just as well, and even better than, we do now." That is
true; I stick to that. I will stand by Judge Douglas in that to the bitter
end. And now, Judge Douglas, come and stand by me, and truthfully show how
they acted, understanding it better than we do. All I ask of you, Judge
Douglas, is to stick to the proposition that the men of the Revolution
understood this subject better than we do now, and with that better
understanding they acted better than you are trying to act now.

I wish to say something now in regard to the Dred Scott decision, as dealt
with by Judge Douglas. In that "memorable debate" between Judge Douglas
and myself, last year, the judge thought fit to commence a process of
catechising me, and at Freeport I answered his questions, and propounded
some to him. Among others propounded to him was one that I have here now.
The substance, as I remember it, is, "Can the people of a United States
Territory, under the Dred Scott decision, in any lawful way, against the
wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery fro