urged that the naval force of the
United States ought not to be regulated by reference to the navies of
the Great Powers, but to the strength of the squadrons which they
usually stationed in time of war on our coasts, at the mouths of great
rivers, and in our harbors. I thought that such a force, incorporated
permanently with our system, would give weight at all times to our
negotiations, and by means thereof prevent wars and save money."[386]
Monroe at this time was not in the Administration. Such a policy was
diametrically opposed to that of Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin; and
when war came, ships had not been provided. Under the circumstances
the disposition of the Government was to put the ships they had under
a glass case.
"At the commencement of the war," wrote Monroe to Jefferson, "I was
decidedly of your opinion, that the best disposition which could be
made of our little navy would be to keep it in a body in a safe port,
from which it might sally, only on some important occasion, to render
essential service. Its safety, in itself, appeared an important
object; as, while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in all
operations along our coast, and increased proportionately his
expense, in the force to be kept up, as well to annoy our commerce as
to protect his own. The reasoning against this, in which all naval
officers have agreed, is that, if stationed together in a port,--New
York, for example,--the British would immediately block up this, by a
force rather superior, and then harass our coast and commerce, without
restraint, and with any force, however small. In that case a single
frigate might, by cruising along the coast, and menacing continually
different parts, keep in motion great bodies of militia; that, while
our frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be met together
will compel the British to keep in a body, whenever they institute a
blockade or cruise, a force equal at least to our own whole force;
that they, [the American vessels] being the best sailors, hazard
little by cruising separately, or together occasionally, as they might
bring on an action, or avoid one, as they saw fit; that in that
measure they would annoy the enemy's commerce wherever they went,
excite alarm in the West Indies and elsewhere, and even give
protection to our own trade by drawing the enemy's squadron from our
own coast.... The reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equal
that it is hard to say which is
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