mounts, in substance, to the proposition,
that Existence and Thought are _one_, that the "subject" and "object" of
knowledge are _one_. "If the doctrine of Identity means anything, it
means that Thought and Being are essentially one; that the process of
_thinking_ is virtually the same as the process of _creating_; that in
constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same
thing as Deity accomplishes in developing himself in all the forms and
regions of creation; that every man's reason, therefore, is really God;
in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent in the
world."[137] It is through the medium of this doctrine of Identity that
Idealism passes into Pantheism,--not, indeed, the Idealism of Berkeley,
which recognized, consistently or otherwise, the existence of the human
mind and of the Divine Spirit, while it denied the independent
existence of matter,--but the Idealism of Fichte and others, which
resolved mind into a mere process of thought, a continuous stream or
succession of ideas. To _such_ a theory the doctrine of Identity was
indispensable. Its advocates were bound to show that nothing existed, or
could be proved to exist, in the universe but _thought_, and that, in
every case, the _subject_ and _object_ of thought might be identified as
one. We find, accordingly, that from the earliest ages down to the
present time, the idea of "absolute unity," or "universal identity," has
been frequently exhibited in connection with the speculations of
philosophical Idealists. The disciples of the Eleatic school in ancient
Greece, not less than those of the modern schools of Germany, insisted
on the identity of thought and its object, and regarded everything that
might seem to be external to the mind as a mere illusion.

It may be difficult for the British mind, familiarized from infancy with
the philosophy of common sense, to grasp the idea which this doctrine
involves; but, on the principles of absolute Idealism, it may be easily
explained, and may even seem to have some foundation in facts that must
be acknowledged by all. There are _two_ cases, particularly, which may
serve to illustrate, if they cannot suffice to prove, it. The first is
that of the Supreme Intelligence, conceived as existing before the
production of a created universe, when He was himself the sole "subject"
and the sole "object" of thought; in other words, the absolute
"Subject-Object." The second is that of th