a future state. In point of
fact, then, all Materialists have not been Atheists; and even were we
convinced that Materialists professing religion were illogical or
inconsequent reasoners, we should not be justified in ascribing to them
those consequences of their system which they explicitly disclaim and
disavow. Still it is competent, and it may be highly useful, to
entertain the question, What are the grounds on which the theory of
Materialism rests? And whether, if these grounds be valid, they would
not lead, in strict logic, to conclusions at variance with some of the
most vital and fundamental articles of the Christian faith?

In attempting to discuss the merits of that theory, we propose to state,
confirm, and illustrate a few propositions which are sufficient, in our
opinion, to show that the grounds on which it rests, and the reasons to
which it appeals, are not such as to warrant or justify any prejudice
against the articles of Natural or Revealed Religion.

SECTION II.

PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM.

I. Our _first_ proposition is, that the recent progress of Natural
Science, great and rapid as it has been, has not materially altered "the
state of the question" respecting the distinction between Mind and
Matter, however much it may have extended our knowledge respecting the
properties of both, and of the relation subsisting between the two.

We place this proposition on the foreground, because we have reason to
believe that a very different impression prevails in certain quarters,
associated in some cases with the hope, in others with the apprehension,
that the advances which have been made in physical science may
ultimately lead to the obliteration of the old distinction between Mind
and Matter. This impression has been deepened by every successive
addition to the doctrines of Physiology; and especially by the recent
speculations on Phrenology, Animal Magnetism, and Clairvoyance. Now, we
think that these speculations, even if they were admitted into the rank
of true sciences, would not materially alter the "state of the question"
respecting the distinction between Mind and Matter, as that question was
discussed in former times.

Take the case of Phrenology. It had always been admitted that the mind
has certain _external organs_, through which it receives various
impressions from without, and holds communication with the sensible
universe. The existence and use of these organs were held to be
perfectly