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mean that strategy should so divide it that both divisions would
be confronted with forces larger than themselves. It may mean,
however, that strategy, in order that the force in one ocean shall
be sufficient, may be compelled to reduce the force in the other
ocean almost to zero.
Some may say that, unless we are sure that our force--say in the
Atlantic--is superadequate, we ought to reduce the force in the
Pacific to actual zero. Maybe contingencies might arise for which
such a division would be the wisest; but usually such a condition
exists that one force is so large that the addition to it of certain
small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas
those small units would be of material value elsewhere--say in
protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. Practically
speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into
Atlantic and Pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal
in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests
on our Atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies
on our Pacific coast.
In estimating the work to be done by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, three
general objects suggest themselves:
1. To repel an attack made directly on our Atlantic continental
coast.
2. To repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the Caribbean,
preliminary to an attack on our Atlantic continental coast or on
the Panama Canal.
3. To make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation
of territory by a foreign government in the south Atlantic or the
Pacific.
_First Object_.--To repel an attack made directly on the Atlantic
coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to
the fleet with the utmost despatch. Owing to the keen appreciation
by European nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack
contemplated by one of them on our Atlantic coast would be prepared
behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be
allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking
force had actually sailed. For the force to reach our shores, not
more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at
mid-Atlantic islands to lay in fuel. It is very doubtful if the
fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the
commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. It is
possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report
the fac
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