t canal from
Massachusetts Bay to Buzzards Bay sufficiently enlarged, the whole
coast from Boston to New York, including Narragansett Bay, could
be made to form one naval base which would have three exits. Our
own ships could pass from one point to another, and concentrate
at will near Sandy Hook, Block Island, or Massachusetts Bay; and,
which is equally important, the establishment of an enemy base
near New York would be made almost, if not quite, impossible.

In case of an attack on our eastern coast, made directly from Europe,
which could be accomplished easily during the calm months of the
summer, the degree of efficiency shown by the bases at Norfolk,
Philadelphia, New York, and Boston would influence vitally the
condition in which our fleet would go to battle. Owing to the
traditional policy, or rather lack of policy, of the United States,
and the consequent unreadiness of our preparations, we may reasonably
assume that war will find us in such a condition that the utmost
haste will be necessary to get our whole naval force out to sea
in time to prevent the enemy from making an actual bombardment of
our shores. We have no reason to suppose that the ships actually
cruising in our active fleet will not be ready; we have every reason
to believe that they will be ready. But it is inconceivable that we
should not try to oppose such an attack with all the naval force
that we could muster; which means that we should try to send out
many ships from our home bases to join the active fleet at sea.

The ease with which the passage of an enemy's fleet up the Delaware
or Chesapeake could be prevented, in case any means of national
defense whatever be attempted, compared with the difficulty of
defending New York, and combined with the greater damage that an
enemy could inflict on New York, mark the vicinity of New York as
the probable objective of any determined naval attack upon our
coast; no matter whether that attack be made directly from Europe,
or indirectly from Europe by way of the Caribbean. To meet such
an attack, various parts of the fleet would have to issue from
their bases; even parts of the active fleet would probably have
had to go to their home ports for some needed repairs or supplies.
The first thought of an attacking fleet would naturally be to prevent
our ships from getting out, as it was the thought of Nelson and
other British commanders to prevent the issuing of forces from
the ports of France. But in v