the carefully planned strategical combinations of the other
force; and catching one part of the enemy's force unsupported by
the other parts may take place during the tactical maneuvers of
an actual or a simulated battle.

In naval operations, the catching of separated parts of an enemy's
force is a more frequent attempt and accomplishment than is that
of getting a position where a column of ships can be attacked from
ahead or astern. It seldom happens, with the great number of vessels
of all kinds which compose a modern fleet, that it is practicable
to keep the various parts together, or that it would be desirable
to do so. The closest approximation to keeping a large naval force
together, is keeping them in column; because in that formation, the
ships can be made simply to "follow the leader" without signal, and
act like one long, flexible body. But the vessels of a modern fleet
would make a column many miles long--a column of 20 battleships alone
would be 5 miles long, and the addition of the various cruisers,
destroyers, and other vessels, would make a column so long that
it would be unwieldy; and if its ends were attacked, the other
vessels could not come to their relief. Besides, the duties of
battleships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines,
are distinct--with the result that, as in land operations, bodies
of the various types operate separately and apart from those of
other types.

Not only, also, do the various types operate separately, but often
the necessities of a case demand that a certain number--say of
battleships--be sent away from the main body on some mission; or
that a certain number of destroyers be sent away from the main
body of destroyers.

Any such diversion entails a danger that is sometimes great, and
sometimes small; but such diversions and risks cannot be avoided,
and should not be avoided when they are necessary, any more than a
man should avoid going out of doors, though that act always entails
some danger. Suppose, for instance, that in the operations of a
war carried on in the Caribbean, the Navy Department should get
trustworthy information that the enemy had detailed 3 battle cruisers
to speed north and bombard New York. The department would probably
have to detach a force from the fleet and send it north, to prevent
the bombardment. Yet not only would the force so sent be in danger
until it returned of an attack by a superior force, but the main body
from which it