es,
say the Bay of Samana, and then establish a base there, unless we
had first seized and fortified all suitable localities; and the
United States would then find itself in the anomalous position
of being confronted near its own coasts with an enemy fleet well
based for war, while her own fleet would not be based at all. Not
only would the enemy fleet be superior in power, but it would possess
the strategical advantage, though far from its own shores. The
situation, therefore, about a month after the foreign fleet left
Europe, would be that the Caribbean Sea would contain a hostile
fleet which was not only superior to ours in power, but was securely
resting on a base; while ours had no base south of Norfolk, the
other side of Hatteras. Our fleet would be in a position similar
to that of the Russian fleet when it rushed to its destruction
in Tsushirna Straits, though not in so great a degree; because
it would have had more recent docking and refitting in our home
ports, and the personnel would be fresher.

In case, however, we had a naval base strongly fortified and thoroughly
equipped, at a salient in the Caribbean region, say at Culebra, and
if our fleet were based upon it, a hostile fleet, even if it were
considerably superior to our own, would hesitate to pass it and
enter the Caribbean, by reason of the continuous threat that the
fleet would exert on its communications. Even if the hostile fleet
should pass Culebra, and establish a base farther on, an American
force based on Culebra would continue to exert this threat on the
communications between the hostile base and its mother country.

An American base--say at Guantanamo--would be very effective in
embarrassing hostile operations _west_ of Guantanamo, because it
would be on the flank of the line of communications extending from
Europe; but it would be comparatively ineffective in embarrassing
operations east of it, since the hostile line of communications
would be protected from it by the interposition of its own main
body; this interposition necessitating the despatch of defending
forces around that main body. The coming hostile force would push
before it all resistance, and leave the sea free for the passage
of its auxiliaries and supplies. A defending force, operating from
Guantanamo, in endeavoring to prevent a hostile fleet from establishing
a base to the _eastward_ of it, would act much less effectively
than a force operating from Culebra. Not only woul