ies were in widely different directions
from us--as are Switzerland and China. If we consider the case
of war against two contiguous countries simultaneously, however,
it would seem better to have one base, situated similarly toward
the home bases of the two countries as toward two different home
bases in one country--since the two countries would be, in effect,
allies; and their fleets would act in reality like separated portions
of one fleet.

As the United States possesses no island on the Atlantic side which
is nearer to foreign countries than to our own, and as our interests
for the immediate future lie mostly on the Atlantic side, it may
be well now to apply the general principles just considered to
the question of where is a naval base most urgently needed under
actual conditions.

Imagining a war between us and some one European naval Power, and
imagining a war also between us and two or three allied European
naval Powers, and realizing the length of our Atlantic and Gulf
coasts, extending from Maine to Panama, a glance at the map shows
us that, apart from the home naval bases on our continental coasts,
the position on American soil which is the closest to European
bases is on the little island of Culebra, which occupies a salient
in the northeastern end of the Caribbean Sea.[*]

[Footnote *: The acquisition by the United States of the island
of Saint Thomas, about 20 miles east of Culebra, if accomplished,
will extend the salient just so much farther toward Europe.]

The only reason an enemy would have for entering the Caribbean
would be an intention to attack the Panama Canal region, or an
intention to establish an advanced base, from which he could conduct
more or less deliberate siege of our Atlantic coast and cities. In
either case, our fleet would be seriously handicapped if it had no
adequate base in the Caribbean; because its line of communications
north would be exposed to the enemy's operations at all times;
and seriously wounded American ships would have little chance of
getting repairs; little chance even of making successfully the long
trip to Norfolk or New York.

In case the enemy fleet should start from Europe fully prepared in
every way, we should be in ignorance of its intended destination;
and as the enemy fleet would be stronger than ours (otherwise it
would not start) it would doubtless be able to destroy our undefended
station at Guantanamo, seize some suitable place in the West Indi