se on the large
island has a large natural harbor and can be more easily defended
against bombardment from the sea. It would be cheaper, for instance,
to protect a base on Culebra than one at Guantanamo, or even Samana,
if the enemy commanded the sea; and cheaper to protect a base on the
forbidding rocks of Polillo or Guam than on the large and fertile
island of Luzon, with its extensive gulfs and bays, in many of
which a fleet in command of the sea could land its force; because
protecting a base on a large island would require covering a very
large area, and perhaps a long extent of coast.

Aircraft may exercise an important influence on the choice of the
position of a base, perhaps in the direction of choosing a base on
a large island rather than on a small one; since the great speed of
aircraft tends to lessen the importance of having the base out a great
distance from home--so far as purposes of scouting are concerned.
It seems probable also that aircraft will soon be recognized as
inherently adapted to preventing the landing of hostile troops,
by dropping bombs on the troops, while they are in process of
disembarkation, while proceeding in small boats to the shore, and
while in the act of landing on the beach, with their guns, ammunition,
supplies, horses, and impedimenta of various kinds.

_Co-operating Bases_.--Discussion of the relative values of positions
for bases, say in the Caribbean, should not blind our eyes to the
fact, however, that no nation is prevented from establishing as
many bases as it needs, wherever its flag may float; that the United
States, for instance, is not debarred from establishing permanent
naval bases at both Guantanamo and Culebra, should such a procedure
seem desirable. The fact that each locality has advantages that the
other does not have, suggests the idea that two bases, placed in
those localities, would form a powerful combination. In fact, the
great value of the position of Culebra being its distance toward the
enemy, which necessitates a great distance away from our continental
coast, and a long line of communications from that coast suggest
an intermediate base as a support and stepping-stone. Analogous
cases are seen in all the countries of Europe, in the fortresses
that are behind their boundary-lines--the fortresses existing less
as individuals than as supporting members of a comprehensive scheme.

Two bases, one at Guantanamo and one at Culebra, would in time
of war i