ttle under such conditions, because it would
not have had a safe refuge to retreat to. It was the proximity of
an adequate naval base, that could be approached through protected
waters only, which justified the weaker fleet in dashing out and
taking advantage of what seemed to be an opportunity. Similarly,
if the Russian fleet in the Japan Sea had had a base near by, from
which it had issued ready in all ways, and to which it could have
retired as soon as the battle began to go against it, the Russian
disaster might not have occurred, and full command of the sea by
the Japanese might have been prevented. But there being no base
or harbor of refuge, disaster succeeded disaster in a cumulative
fashion, and the Russian fleet was annihilated in deep water.

If a naval base were lacking to the more powerful fleet, as was
the case in the battle of Manila, the effect would in many cases
be but slight--as at Manila. If, however, the more powerful fleet
were badly injured, the absence of a base would be keenly felt and
might entail disaster in the future, even though the more powerful
fleet were actually victorious. The Japanese fleet was practically
victorious at the battle of August 10, near Port Arthur; but if it
had not been able to refit and repair at a naval base, it would
have met the Russian fleet later with much less probability of
success.

Mahan states that the three main requirements in a naval base are
position, resources, and strength; and of these he considers that
position is the most important; largely because resources and strength
can be artificially supplied, while position is the gift of nature,
and cannot be moved or changed.

Mahan's arguments seem to suggest that the bases he had in mind
were bases distant from home, not home bases; since reference is
continually made by him to the distance and direction of bases
from important strategic points of actual or possible enemies.

His arguments do not seem to apply with equal force to home bases,
for the reason that home bases are intended primarily as bases
from which operations are to start; secondarily as bases to which
fleets may return, and only remotely as bases during operations;
whereas, distant bases are intended as points from which operations
may continually be carried on, during the actual prosecution of
a war. The position of a home base, for instance, as referred to
any enemy's coasts or bases, is relatively unimportant, compared
with its a