rs to avoid action unless certain
of success. On the other hand, the American commander, Chauncey,
though an energetic organizer, made the mistake of assuming that his
mission was also defensive. Hence when one fleet was strengthened by
a new ship it went out and chased the other off the lake, but there
was little fighting, both sides engaging in a grand shipbuilding
rivalry and playing for a sure thing. Naval control remained unsettled
and shifting throughout the war. It was fortunate, indeed, says
the British historian, James, that the war ended when it did, or
there would not have been room on the lake to maneuver the two
fleets. The _St. Lawrence_, a 112-gun three-decker completed at
Kingston in 1814, was at the time the largest man-of-war in the
world.

Possibly a growing lukewarmness about the war, manifested on both
sides, prevented more aggressive action. But it did not prevent two
brilliant American victories in the lesser theaters of Lake Erie
and Lake Champlain. Perry's achievement on Lake Erie in building
a superior flotilla in the face of all manner of obstacles was even
greater than that of the victory itself. The result of the latter,
won on September 10, 1813, is summed up in his despatch: "We have
met the enemy and they are ours--2 ships, 2 brigs, 1 schooner, and
1 sloop." It assured the safety of the northwestern frontier.

On Lake Champlain Macdonough's successful defense just a year later
held up an invasion which, though it would not have been pushed
very strenuously in any case, might have made our position less
favorable for the peace negotiations then already under way. In
this action, as in the one on Lake Erie, the total strength of each
of the opposing flotillas, measured in weight of broadsides (1192
pounds for the British against 1194 far the Americans), was about
that of a single ship-of-the-line. But the number of units employed
raised all the problems of a squadron engagement. Macdonough's
shrewd choice of position in Plattsburg Bay, imposing upon the
enemy a difficult approach under a raking fire, and his excellent
handling of his ships in action, justify his selection as the ablest
American naval leader developed by the war.

At the outbreak of the American War, France and England had been
engaged in a death grapple in which the rights of neutrals were
trampled under foot. Napoleon, by his paper blockade and confiscations
on any pretext, had been a more glaring offender. But America