cks, feeble engines, and general awkwardness, the
_Merrimac_ could scarcely navigate in Hampton Roads. In the first
day's fighting her beak was wrenched off and a leak started, two
guns were put out of action, and her funnel and all other top-hamper
were riddled. As was shown by Farragut in Mobile Bay, and again by
Tegetthoff at Lissa, even wooden vessels, if in superior numbers,
might do something against an ironclad in an aggressive melee.

Both the antagonists at Hampton Roads ended their careers before
the close of 1862; the _Merrimac_ was burned by her crew at the
evacuation of Norfolk, and the _Monitor_ was sunk under tow in a
gale off Hatteras. But turret ships, monitors, and armored gunboats
soon multiplied in the Union navy and did effective service against
the defenses of Southern harbors and rivers. Under Farragut's energetic
leadership, vessels both armored and unarmored passed with relatively
slight injury the forts below New Orleans, at Vicksburg, and at the
entrance to Mobile Bay. Even granting that the shore artillery was
out of date and not very expertly served, it is well to realize that
similar conditions may conceivably recur, and that the superiority
of forts over ships is qualified by conditions of equipment and
personnel.

Actually to destroy or capture shore batteries by naval force is
another matter. As Ericsson said, "A single shot will sink a ship,
while 100 rounds cannot silence a fort."[1] Attacks of this kind
against Fort McAllister and Charleston failed. At Charleston, April
7, 1863, the ironclads faced a cross-fire from several forts, 47
smoothbores and 17 rifles against 29 smoothbores and 4 rifles in
the ships, and in waters full of obstructions and mines.

[Footnote 1: Wilson, IRONCLADS IN ACTION, Vol. I, p. 91.]

The capture of Fort Fisher, commanding the main entrance to Wilmington,
North Carolina, was accomplished in January, 1865, by the combined
efforts of the army and navy. The fort, situated on a narrow neck
of land between the Cape Fear River and the sea, had 20 guns on
its land face and 24 on its sea face, 15 of them rifled. Against
it were brought 5 ironclads with 18 guns, backed up by over 200
guns in the rest of the fleet. After a storm of shot and shell
for three successive days, rising at times to "drum-fire," the
barrage was lifted at a signal and troops and sailors dashed forward
from their positions on shore. Even after this preparation the
capture cost 1000 men. A