ip seized the chance and rammed her squarely amidships
at full speed, crashing through her armor and opening an immense
hole. The Italian gunboat heeled over to starboard, then back again,
and in a few seconds went down, with a loss of 381 men.
This spectacular incident practically decided the battle. After
an hour's fighting the two squadrons drew apart about noon, the
Austrians finally entering St. Giorgio harbor and the Italians
withdrawing to westward. During the retreat the fire on the _Palestro_
reached her ammunition and she blew up with a loss of 231 of her
crew. Except in the two vessels destroyed, the Italian losses were
slight--8 killed and 40 wounded. But the armored ships were badly
battered, and less than a month later the _Affondatore_ sank in a
squall in Ancona harbor, partly, it was thought, owing to injuries
received at Lissa.
For a long time after this fight, an exaggerated view was held
regarding the value of ramming, line abreast formation, and bow
fire. Weapons condition tactics, and these tactics of Tegetthoff
were suited to the means he had to work with. But they were not
those which should have been adopted by his opponents; nor would
they have been successful had the Italians brought their broadsides
to bear on a parallel course and avoided a melee. What the whole
campaign best illustrates--and the lesson has permanent interest--is
how a passive and defensive policy, forced upon the Italian fleet
by the incompetence of its admiral or otherwise, led to its
demoralization and ultimate destruction. After a long period of
inactivity, Persano weakened his force against shore defenses before
he had disposed of the enemy fleet, and was then taken at a
disadvantage. His passive strategy was reflected in his tactics.
He engaged with only a part of his force, and without a definite
plan; "A storm of signals swept over his squadron" as it went into
action. What really decided the battle was not the difference in
ships, crews, or weapons, but the difference in aggressiveness
and ability of the two admirals in command.
_The Battle of the Yalu_
Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant
naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and
Japan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since
at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the
initial situation at Lissa was duplicated--line abreast against
line ahead. The result, however, wa
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