the
fleet were to guard the British Isles from raids and invasion,
to protect British commerce in all parts of the world, and, on
the offensive, to seize enemy colonies, cut off enemy trade, and
cooperate in the Mediterranean with allied armies. To accomplish
these aims, which called for a wide dispersion of forces, the British
naval superiority over France was barely adequate. According to
the contemporary naval historian James, the strength of the two
fleets at the outbreak of war was as follows:
Ships of the Aggregate
line Guns broadsides
------------------------------------------------
British 115 8,718 88,957
French 76 6,002 73,057
Of her main fighting units, the ships-of-the-line, England could put
into commission about 85, which as soon as possible were distributed
in three main spheres of operation: in the Mediterranean and its
western approaches, from 20 to 25; in the West Indies, from 10 to
12; in home waters, from the North Sea to Cape Finisterre, from
20 to 25, with a reserve of some 25 more in the home bases on the
Channel. Though this distribution was naturally altered from time
to time to meet changes in the situation, it gives at least an
idea of the general disposition of the British forces throughout
the war. France, with no suitable bases in the Channel, divided
her fleet between the two main arsenals at Brest and Toulon, with
minor squadrons at Rochefort and, during the Spanish alliance,
in the ports of Spain.
_Distant Operations_
In the West Indies and other distant waters, France could offer
but little effective resistance, and operations there may hence
be dismissed briefly, but with emphasis on the benefit which naval
control conferred upon British trade, the main guaranty of England's
financial stability and power to keep up the war. Fully one-fifth
of this trade was with the West Indies. Consequently, both to swell
the volume of British commerce and protect it from privateering,
the seizure of the French West Indian colonies--"filching the sugar
islands," as Sheridan called it--was a very justifiable war measure,
in spite of the scattering of forces involved. Hayti was lost to
France as a result of the negro uprising under Toussaint l'Ouverture.
Practically all the French Antilles changed hands twice in 1794,
the failure of the British to hold them arising from a combination
of yellow
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