nce and admiration. Yet the contrast between
them well illustrates the difference between all-round professional
and administrative ability, possessed in high degree by the older
leader, and supreme fighting genius, which, in spite of mental
and moral qualities far inferior, has rightly won Nelson a more
lasting fame. As a member of parliament before the war, as First
Lord of the Admiralty from 1801 to 1803, and indeed in his sea
commands, Jervis displayed a breadth of judgment, a knowledge of
the world, a mastery of details of administration, to which Nelson
could not pretend. In the organization of the Toulon and the Brest
blockades, and in the suppression of mutiny in 1797, Jervis better
than Nelson illustrates conventional ideals of military discipline.
When appointed to the Channel command in 1799 he at once adopted
the system of keeping the bulk of the fleet constantly on the enemy
coast "well within Ushant with an easterly wind." Captains were to
be on deck when ships came about at whatever hour. In port there
were no night boats and no night leave for officers. To one officer
who ventured a protest Jervis wrote that he "ought not to delay
one day his intention to retire." "May the discipline of the
Mediterranean never be introduced in the Channel," was a toast on
Jervis's appointment to the latter squadron. "May his next glass
of wine choke the wretch," was the wish of an indignant officer's
wife. Jervis may have been a martinet, but it was he, more than
any other officer, who instilled into the British navy the spirit
of war.

In the Mediterranean, however, he arrived too late. There, as in
the Atlantic, the French Directory after the experiments of 1794
and 1795 had now abandoned the idea of risking their battleships;
and while these still served effectively in port as a fleet in
being, their crews were turned to commerce warfare or transport
flotilla work for the army. Bonaparte's ragged heroes were driving
the Austrians out of Italy. Sardinia made peace in May of 1796.
Spain closed an offensive and defensive alliance with the French
Republic in August, putting a fleet of 50 of the line (at least
on paper) on Jervis's communications and making further tenure
of the Mediterranean a dangerous business. By October, 26 Spanish
ships had joined the 12 French then at Toulon. Even so, Jervis with
his force of 22 might have hazarded action, if his subordinate Mann,
with a detached squadron of 7 of these, had not fl