e and the
Dutch forces were watched by Admiral Keith with 11 of the line and
150 smaller units scattered from the Texel to the Channel Islands.
The 21 French ships under Ganteaume at Brest, the strategic center,
were closely blockaded by Cornwallis, whose force, by Admiralty
orders, was not to fall below 18 of the line. A small squadron had
been watching Missiessy's 5 ships at Rochefort and upon his escape
in January had followed him to the West Indies. The 5 French and 10
Spanish at Ferrol and the 6 or more ready for sea at Cadiz were
held in check by forces barely adequate. In the Gulf of Lyons Nelson
with 13 ships had since May, 1803, stood outside the distant but
dangerous station of Toulon. Owing to the remoteness from bases,
a close and constant blockade was here impossible; moreover, it
was the policy to let the enemy get out in the hope of bringing
him to action at sea.

[Illustration: POSITIONS OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805]

To effect a concentration in the Channel in the face of these obstacles
was the final aim of all Napoleon's varied naval combinations of
1804 and 1805--combinations which impress one with the truth of
Graviere's criticism that the Emperor lacked "_le sentiment exact
des difficultes de la marine_," and especially, one should perhaps
add, _de la marine francaise_. The first plan, the simplest and,
therefore, most promising, was that Latouche Treville with the
Toulon fleet should evade Nelson and, after releasing ships on
the way, enter the Channel with 16 of the line, while Cornwallis
was kept occupied by Ganteaume. This was upset by the death of
Latouche, France's ablest and most energetic admiral, in August
of 1804, and by the accession, two months later, of Spain and the
Spanish navy to the French cause. After many misgivings Napoleon
chose Villeneuve to succeed at Toulon. Skilled in his profession,
honest, and devoted, he was fatally lacking in self-confidence
and energy to conquer difficulties. "It is sad," wrote an officer
in the fleet, "to see that force which under Latouche was full of
activity, now without faith in either their leader or themselves."

The final plan, though still subject to modifications, was for
a concentration on a larger scale in the West Indies. Villeneuve
was to go thither, picking up the Cadiz ships on the way, join
the Rochefort squadron if it were still there, and wait 40 days
for the Brest fleet. Upon its arrival the entire force of 40 ships