Swedish sail of the line or the 14 Russian ships at Revel should
take the offensive, would be that of central position, between
the enemy divisions.

"Supposing us through the Belt," the letter concludes, "with the
wind northwesterly, would it not be possible to either go with
the fleet or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one
Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron
at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment,
and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The
measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion that the boldest
measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous
assertion of her force, directed with judgment."

Here was a striking plan of aggressive warfare, aimed at the heart of
the coalition. The proposal to leave part of the fleet at Copenhagen
was indeed a dangerous compromise, involving divided forces and
threatened communications, but was perhaps justified by the known
inefficiency of the Russians and the fact that the Danes were actually
fought and defeated with a force no greater than the plan provided.
In the end the more conservative course was adopted of settling
with Denmark first. Keeping well to the eastern shore, the fleet
on March 30 passed into the Sound without injury from the fire of
the Kronenburg forts at its entrance, and anchored that evening
near Copenhagen.

Three days later, on April 2, 1801, the attack was made as planned,
from the southward end of the Middle Ground. Nelson in the _Elephant_
commanded the fighting squadron, which consisted of seven 74's,
three 64's and two of 50 guns, with 18 bomb vessels, sloops, and
fireships. The rest of the ships, under Parker, were anchored at
the other end of the shoal and 5 miles north of the city; it seems
they were to have cooperated, but the south wind which Nelson needed
made attack impossible for them. Against the Danish total of 696
guns on the ships and Trekroner fortification, Nelson's squadron
had 1014, but three of his main units grounded during the approach
and were of little service. There was no effort at concentration,
the British when in position engaging the whole southern part of
the Danish line. "Here," in the words of Nelson's later description,
"was no maneuvering; it was downright fighting"--a hotly contested
action against ships and shore batteries lasting from 10 a. m., when
the _Elephant_ led into position on the bow of Co