es west of Ushant, it would have been quite
possible for him to have closed with the British, who were 10 miles
to leeward in a fresh southerly wind. But his orders were not to
fight unless it were essential to protect the convoy, and since
this was thought to be close at hand, he first drew away to the
eastward, with the British in pursuit.
The chase continued during the remainder of this day and the day
following, with partial engagements and complicated maneuvering,
the net result of which was that in the end Howe, in spite of the
superior sailing qualities of the French ships, had kept in touch
with them, driven his own vessels through their line to a windward
position, and forced the withdrawal of four units, with the loss of
but one of his own. Two days of thick weather followed, during which
both fleets stood to the northwest in the same relative positions,
the French, very fortunately indeed, securing a reenforcement of
four fresh ships from detachments earlier at sea.
Now 26 French to 25 British, the two fleets on the morning of the
final engagement were moving to westward on the still southerly wind,
in two long, roughly parallel lines. Confident of the individual
superiority of his ships, the British admiral had no wish for further
maneuvering, in which his own captains had shown themselves none
too reliable and the enemy commander not unskilled. Possibly also
he feared the confusion of a complicated plan, for it was notorious
(as may be verified by looking over his correspondence) that Howe
had the greatest difficulty in making himself intelligible with
tongue or pen. His orders were therefore to bear up together toward
the enemy and attack ship to ship, without effort at concentration,
and with but one noteworthy departure from the time-honored tactics
in which he had been schooled. This was that the battle should be
close and decisive. The instructions were that each ship should
if possible break through the line astern of her chosen opponent,
raking the ships on each side as she went through, and continue
the action to leeward, in position to cut off retreat. "I don't
want the ships to be bilge to bilge," said Howe to the officers
of his flagship, the _Queen Charlotte_, "but if you can lock the
yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided."
The approach was leisurely, nearly in line abreast, on a course
slightly diagonal to that of the enemy. At 10 A. M. the _Queen
Charlotte_,
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