it came into this human form; so that
from hence, also, the soul appears to be something immortal."
"But, Cebes," said Simmias, interrupting him, "what proofs are there of
these things? Remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at
present."
48. "It is proved," said Cebes, "by one argument, and that a most
beautiful one, that men, when questioned (if one questions them
properly) of themselves, describe all things as they are, however, if
they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be
able to do this. Moreover, if one leads them to diagrams, or any thing
else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the
case."
"But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias," said Socrates, "see
if you will agree with us in considering the matter thus. For do you
doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?"
"I do not doubt," said Simmias; "but I require this very thing of which
we are speaking, to be reminded; and, indeed, from what Cebes has begun
to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however,
I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it."
"I do it thus" he replied: "we admit, surely, that if any one be
reminded of any thing, he must needs have known that thing at some time
or other before."
"Certainly," he said.
49. "Do we, then, admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a
certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this: if any
one, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any
other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also
form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same,
but different, should we not justly say that he remembered that of which
he received the idea?"
"How mean you?"
"For instance, the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre."
"How not?"
"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment,
or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus
affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the
form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just
as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an
infinite number of similar instances."
"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.
"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence,
especially when one is thus affected w
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