ith respect to things which, from
lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"

"Certainly," he replied.

50. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen that when one sees a
painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man, and that when
one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?"

"Certainly."

"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is
reminded of Simmias himself?"

"It does, indeed," he replied.

"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence
arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"

"It does."

"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one
should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards
likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been
reminded?"

"It is necessary," he replied.

"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that
there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with
another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind,
but something altogether different from all these--abstract equality; do
we allow that there is any such thing, or not?"

"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied Simmias.

51. "And do we know what it is itself?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things
we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or
other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of
that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be
different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and
logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at
another not?"

"Certainly."

"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or
equality inequality?"

"Never, Socrates, at any time."

"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the
same?"

"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."

"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from
that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your
knowledge of it?"

"You speak most truly," he replied.

"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"

"Certainly."

"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one
thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another,