whether
like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."
"Certainly."
52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such
way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of?
And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract
equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at
all, of being such as equality itself is?"
"They fall far short," he replied.
"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing,
perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something
else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that
is, but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must
necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it
resembles, though imperfectly?"
"It is necessary."
"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to
things equal and abstract equality itself?"
"Assuredly."
"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality
before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that
they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
"Such is the case."
53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not
possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or
some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things
which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall
short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
"Even so."
"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we
must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is, if we were to
refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe
that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it."
"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said."
"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our
other senses?"
"Certainly."
"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a
knowledge of abstract equality?"
"Yes."
"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born."
"It seems so."
54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born
possessing it, we knew, both be
|