else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account--that is, on
account of magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than
littleness, and on this account less--that is, on account of littleness;
being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument should meet you if
you should say that any one is greater and less by the head; as, first,
that the greater is greater, and the less less, by the very same thing;
and, next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and
that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something
small. Should you not be afraid of this?"

To which said Cebes, smilingly, "Indeed, I should."

"Should you not, then," he continued, "be afraid to say that ten is more
than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds it, and not by number,
and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit
by half, and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the same)?"

"Certainly," he replied.

115. "What, then? When one has been added to one, would you not beware
of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two, or division
when it has been divided; and would you not loudly assert that you know
no other way in which each thing subsists, than by partaking of the
peculiar essence of each of which it partakes, and that in these cases
you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of
duality; and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of
this, and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and
additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving them to
be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself; whereas you,
fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience, would adhere
to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But if any one should
assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not dismiss him, and refrain
from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting
from it, whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each
other? But when it should be necessary for you to give a reason for it,
would you give one in a similar way, by again laying down another
hypothesis, which should appear the best of higher principles, until you
arrived at something satisfactory; but, at the same time, you would
avoid making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first
principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to
arrive at th