d withdraw when its contrary,
the little, approaches it, or, when it has actually come, to perish; but
that it is not disposed, by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be
different from what it was. Just as I, having received and sustained
littleness, and still continuing the person that I am, am this same
little person; but that, while it is great, never endures to be little.
And, in like manner, the little that is in us is not disposed at any
time to become or to be great, nor is any thing else among contraries,
while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become and
to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs or
perishes."
119. "It appears so to me," said Cebes, "in every respect."
But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly
remember who he was, said, "By the gods! was not the very contrary of
what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that
the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater,
and, in a word, that the very production of contraries is from
contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never
be the case."
Upon this Socrates, having leaned his head forward and listened, said,
"You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the
difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it
was said that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now,
that a contrary can never become contrary to itself--neither that which
is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of
things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those
things; but now we are speaking of those very things from the presence
of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very
things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from
each other." 120. And, at the same time looking at Cebes, "Has anything
that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"
"Indeed," said Cebes, "I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no
means say that there are not many things that disturb me."
"Then," he continued, "we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can
never be contrary to itself."
"Most certainly," he replied.
"But, further," he said, "consider whether you will agree with me in
this also. Do you call heat and cold any thing?"
"I do."
"The same as snow and fire?"
"By Jupiter! I do not."
"But heat is s
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