fore we were born and as soon as we were
born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of
the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality
than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and, in one
word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence,
both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. So that we must
necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."
"Such is the case."
"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should
always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through
life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to
retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the
loss of knowledge?"
"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.
55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our
birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things,
we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that
which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying
that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?"
"Certainly."
"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing,
either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an
idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with
which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said,
one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this
knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn
afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be
reminiscence."
"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."
56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with
knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?"
"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."
"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think
about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things
that he knows, or not?"
"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.
"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things
of which we have just now been speaking?"
"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that at
this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this
properly."
"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said
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