that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor
less harmonized: is it so?"
"It is."
"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more
or less harmony, or an equal amount?"
"An equal amount."
97. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a
soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?"
"Even so."
"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a greater degree
of discord or harmony?"
"Certainly not."
"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater
degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue
harmony?"
"It can not."
"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will
partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony, which is
perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"
"Certainly not."
"Neither, therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
vice."
"How can it, from what has been already said?"
"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally
good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?"
"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.
"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly argued,
and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were
correct, that the soul is harmony?"
98. "On no account whatever," he replied.
"But what," said he, "of all the things that are in man? Is there any
thing else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be
wise?"
"I should say not."
"Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them?
My meaning is this: for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by
drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from drinking; and when
hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand
other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we
not?"
"Certainly."
"But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would
never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or
any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would
follow, and never govern them?"
"We did allow it," he replied, "for how could we do otherwise?"
"What, then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary,
ruling over all the parts from which any one might say it subsists, and
resisting almost all of them t
|