the souls of the dead must
necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced."

45. "It appears to me, Socrates," he said "that this must necessarily
follow from what has been admitted."

"See now, O Cebes!" he said, "that we have not agreed on these things
improperly, as it appears to me; for if one class of things were not
constantly given back in the place of another, revolving, as it were, in
a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its
opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its
course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form,
be in the same state, and cease to be produced?"

"How say you?" he asked.

"It is by no means difficult," he replied, "to understand what I mean;
if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no
reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at
length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it
would be thought nothing at all of, because everything else would be in
the same state as he--namely, asleep. And if all things were mingled
together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be
verified, 'all things would be together.' 46. Likewise, my dear Cebes,
if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead
should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not
necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing
alive? For if living beings are produced from other things, and living
beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?"

"Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates," replied Cebes; "but you appear to
me to speak the exact truth."

"For, Cebes," he continued, "as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the
case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, for it is
in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are
produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the
condition of the good is better, and of the evil worse."

47. "And, indeed," said Cebes, interrupting him, "according to that
doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing,
if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence,
according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former
time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless
our soul existed somewhere before