tions of modern times. Among
the ancients scarcely anything of the sort was known."--_Robert Hall_. Yet
without a correct analysis of the powers of the human mind, and of the
relations they sustain to each other, as well as to external objects and
influences, it is impossible to shed one ray of light on the relation
subsisting between the existence of moral evil and the divine glory. The
theory of motion is "the key to nature." It was with this key that Newton,
the great high-priest of nature, entered into her profoundest recesses,
and laid open her most sublime secrets to the admiration of mankind. In
like manner, the true theory of action is the key to the intellectual
world, by which its difficulties are to be laid open and its enigmas
solved. Not possessing this key, it was as impossible for Plato, or for
any other philosopher, to penetrate the mystery of sin's existence, as it
would have been, without a knowledge of the laws of motion, to comprehend
the stupendous problem of the material universe.

Secondly, the ancient philosophers laboured under the insuperable
disadvantage, that the sublime disclosures of revelation had not been made
known to the world. Hence the materials were wanting out of which to
construct a Theodicy, or vindication of the perfections of God. For if we
could see only so much of this world's drama as is made known by the light
of nature, it would not be possible to reconcile it with the character of
its great Author. No one was more sensible of this defect of knowledge
than Plato himself; and its continuance was, in his view, inconsistent
with the goodness of the divine Being. Hence his well-known prediction,
that a teacher would be sent from God to clear up the darkness of man's
present destiny, and to withdraw the veil from its future glory. The facts
of revelation cannot, of course, be logically assumed as verities, in an
argument with the atheist; but still, as we shall hereafter see, they may,
in connexion with other truths, be made to serve a most important and
legitimate function in exploding his sophisms and objections.

Section II.

The failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair.

It is alleged, that since Leibnitz exhausted the resources of his vast
erudition, and exerted the powers of his mighty intellect without success,
to solve the problem in question, it is in vain for any one else to
attempt its solution. Leibnitz, himself, was too