f the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed
Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical
distinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by
the Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing
persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with
injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious
actions), or with final release[45].--But how can the means of right
knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have
for their object that which is dependent on Nescience[46]?--Because, we
reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a
knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on
the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical
with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the
employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right
knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body[47]) the
senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the
nature of the Self is not superimposed[48]. Nor can, in the absence of
all that[49], the Self which, in its own nature is free from all
contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the
means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence
perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts
have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human
cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition
described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect
of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities
affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance
according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or
disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching
with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and
therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some
fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher
intelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows
drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently
approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that
men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to
the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known t
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