religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman
and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore
intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition
of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while
declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which
are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII,
1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so
perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious
duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised
by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who
knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman
is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned
means.

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be
given in the next Sutra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed
that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance,
the brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the
literal translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of
knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally
supplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an
object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not
the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary
relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it
might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the
general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This
assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the
direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an
altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the
words of the Sutra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with
Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of
discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we
reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the
statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary
matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all
objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those
objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahma