s enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout
meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying
information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the
latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which
give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised
object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from
other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be
connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to
man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,'
which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in
so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7,
'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions,
therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way
mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far
as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are
accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;'
which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the
dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can
be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action.
And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects
cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the
Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin
actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with
those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its
involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the
Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka/nd/a of the Veda),
we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.)
that the Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar
actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of
all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is
connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport.

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view
as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the
cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known