tier cannot have so
favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
retired.

A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of
sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
should be a _tete de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams.

All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.

The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
Operations:--

"The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
consequently, upon the direction of the bases.

[Illustration: Fig. 1.]

"If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy
occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1,
p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
D; the latter would be thrown upon the