positions were interior and central and presented three
different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line
of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to
the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the
strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended
his operations to these points.
The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
positions.
The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies,
and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of
operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought
to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend
far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this
direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on
account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens
that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and
parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic
front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this
means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained,
thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a
base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)
The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made
the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew,
from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka,
to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the
Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be
obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It
ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words,
that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and
should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein
upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the f
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