ccordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim
to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and
were applied by Caesar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them
out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various
applications.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given
rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great
routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three
routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three
lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a
double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have
a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to
designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set
them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single
corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or
radii, but the operation was not double.]

[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central
positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are
mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two
masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these
are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have
done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of
double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the
theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after
all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]

[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;
for Melas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
unable to recruit for his army, b