mportance of securing the
strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their
co-operation cannot be obtained.

EPITOME OF STRATEGY

* * * * *

The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled
by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which
enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the
definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important
operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that
we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating
of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations
of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of
which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.

By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will
be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give
a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.

From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters
of operations is found in what follows:--

1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
accordance with Article XVIII.

2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic
field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy
with the least risk to one's self.

3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
retreats parallel to the frontiers.

On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success
of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations
upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined
by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
presented in Article XXI.

4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them
such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the
forces, and to prevent the parts