ed; but the principles are
unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then
the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best
suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.

ARTICLE XXXIV.

Of Surprises of Armies.

I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief
features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light
Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself
to an examination of the surprise of whole armies.

Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected
than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are
heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to
an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten
and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known
because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War
presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that
a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the
combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity
of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it
so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from
their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.

As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan
one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's
camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a
surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected
attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in
1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but
there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his
own negligence.

It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to
fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of
the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certa