, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before
mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they
covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time
than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver
for instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had,
it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage;
but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions
is not at all diminished by it.

Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten
copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge
of the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing,
whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the
center. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not
been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene
of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of the
enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few
detachments following corps to which they did not belong. The most
remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that
after such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince
of Wagram.

The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree;
but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten
copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of
the troops?

Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good
logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting this
battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in the
midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it
was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the
banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. These
precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but
they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well
as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder
and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up of
the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness
upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name,
owing to the manner of Berthier's management of it. We must also agree
that Napole