Fig. 30, where each battalion is formed
into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division.
It is really a line of small columns
In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[47] will
have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way
too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the
artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed,
whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two
ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the
other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of
the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these
skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31.)
Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides
those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be,
also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having
really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred
men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each
battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.[48] A battalion of
eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four
divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first
alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. Bach
battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a
volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in Fig. 31 it would deliver
four hundred.
[Illustration: Fig. 31.]
While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we
must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and
that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to
fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement
is lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous
against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three
ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry.
The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularly
at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my
chapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The brave
cavalry of Bessieres could make no impression upon these small masses.
To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it
is true, be recalled, and
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