ivision would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of
battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the
system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:--

I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to
the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is
important that in every language there should be two different terms to
express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions
and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion.

Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary
already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I
devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations
relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which
consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the
central one, the other two being in column on the wings.

* * * * *

After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:--

1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.

2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be
as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was
successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento.

3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in
marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over
an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient
order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the
front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry.

I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as
impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the
attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for
success.

Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these
terms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault
upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the
assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in
good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from
each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass
as a whole.

I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden,
Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it o