ility and force
than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of
artillery.

I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the
Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He
answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the
English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line
formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines.
He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends
upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act
in the same manner under all circumstances."

To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the
campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the
infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the
most suitable,--which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.

The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at
Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns
of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.

If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it
would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at
least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line
extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but
several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed
in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being
deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.

This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms
of the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of four
regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which
is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on
the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by
divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813
should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it
very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order,
would have executed one of the following formations:--

1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in
four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to
the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight
battalions.[57]

2. Or each d