lf of the men of his
company under the command of another officer, and half of his own
division would be made up of another company.
Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as
the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his
own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than
any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a
decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it
would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to
run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French
system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as
many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each
company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be
two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an
advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation
between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater
display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there,
to command the division as a whole.
It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important
question at issue.
Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper
to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light
of historical events.
In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command a
mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence
in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of
instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred
of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the
enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and
impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and
Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity
and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult
to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and
Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the
inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the
tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled
the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire,
while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were
posted a
|