ordinate officers envy and deceive him,[52] he will
undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations
can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost
unavoidable defeat.

No system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is
bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some
occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling.
Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence
to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.

These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound
rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will
lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with
mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but
it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which
should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for
these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding
brave troops, means of almost certain success.

The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains
to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability
consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however,
leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim
relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the
greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and
place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations
which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to
be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for
the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the
field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a
strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a
column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist
of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear,
or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the
adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause
of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is
simply impossible.

If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war,
his first